Moving Past Mysticism in Psychedelic Science

Earlier literature linking psychedelic experiences with mysticism has shaped much contemporary psychedelic research and clinical practice. Sanders and colleagues trace this lineage to W. T. Stace's mid‑20th century concept of a distinctive "mystical consciousness", characterised by features such as unity, timelessness, sacredness, paradoxicality and ineffability. Early researchers operationalised Stace's criteria into psychometric instruments—most notably the Mystical Experience Questionnaire, Hood's Mysticism Scale and certain dimensions of the Altered States of Consciousness Questionnaire—which have shown internal reliability and some predictive validity for therapeutic outcomes. Against this background, the authors identify a worrying gap: persistent reliance on mysticism imports theological or supernatural connotations into scientific discourse, risks creating a ‘‘black box’’ mentality that treats aspects of the psychedelic state as beyond empirical inquiry, and may bias participant responses by priming mystical interpretations. The paper sets out to argue that psychedelic science should replace mysticism as a guiding framework with demystified, secular, empirically grounded models that better link subjective reports to psychobiological mechanisms and avoid problematic public misinterpretation.

Sanders and colleagues present a critical analysis of the conceptual and measurement problems that follow from using the mysticism framework in psychedelic research. They note that alternative labels such as "peak experience" or "oceanic boundlessness" remain tethered to Stace's original construct, so simple terminological swaps do not resolve the underlying theoretical dependence. The authors argue that experimental settings and modern methods—neuroimaging, controlled induction techniques such as hypnosis, and expectancy manipulations—make the psychedelic state more tractable to empirically driven study than Stace assumed. A central methodological concern is that psychometric validation (for example, factor structure or prediction of outcomes) does not by itself justify the conceptual importation of mysticism. Questionnaires like the Mystical Experience Questionnaire may serve as useful predictors of therapeutic change while failing to isolate the causal psychobiological processes they purport to measure. Administering mysticism‑oriented instruments can also prime participants to interpret experiences through a mystical lens, which the authors say risks contaminating data and reifying supernaturalist interpretations. They point out that other, more mundane psychological constructs and self‑report measures may account for therapeutic outcomes with fewer conceptual complications, although specific alternative measures are not exhaustively enumerated in the extracted text.

The authors outline a constructive path forward in which cognitive neuroscience and computational models furnish secular, testable accounts of the phenomena currently labelled mystical. In particular, they highlight predictive processing frameworks that conceive psychedelic effects as pharmacologically induced relaxations or reconfigurations of high‑level self‑related priors; feelings of connectedness and unity could then be interpreted as transient loosening of beliefs about separation from the environment and others. Sanders and colleagues emphasise that such models require validation and critical testing, but they illustrate how previously theological or ineffable qualities might be rendered intelligible and useful in ordinary psychological terms. In practical terms, the paper suggests that demystified frameworks could improve translation to patients and the public by providing accessible, non‑supernatural explanations; this may reduce unrealistic expectations, protect vulnerable groups, and increase scientific credibility. The authors also argue that clearer models could enhance therapeutic precision—helping to optimise psychedelic treatment protocols, inspire non‑drug interventions that target the same psychological processes, and illuminate causal factors in conditions such as major depression. They acknowledge the need for rigorous empirical work to test proposed mechanisms and for instruments that measure the intended constructs rather than merely predicting outcomes; the extracted text notes these as open tasks rather than providing empirical resolutions.

Sanders and colleagues conclude that the current blending of mysticism and science endangers the credibility and translational potential of psychedelic research. They call for a theoretical shift toward unambiguously secular frameworks, the development or adoption of alternative questionnaires that measure rather than merely predict, and clear articulation of how empirical data map onto psychobiological concepts. With those changes, the authors contend, states of consciousness presently treated as an elusive black box can be reconceptualised in ways that benefit both science and society.