A Single Belief-Changing Psychedelic Experience Is Associated With Increased Attribution of Consciousness to Living and Non-living Entities

The paper addresses whether a single psychedelic experience can alter how people attribute conscious awareness to other living and non-living entities. The authors situate the question within long-standing debates about the nature of consciousness and the problem of other minds, note that psychedelics produce striking changes in phenomenological experience, and cite prior work showing that psychedelic experiences can change metaphysical beliefs (for example, increased agreement with panpsychism). The introduction identifies a gap in empirical data directly linking psychedelic experiences to changes in mind‑attribution and motivates an investigation using retrospective self-report of belief change following a single psychedelic episode. This study therefore set out to measure changes in participants' beliefs about the capacity for conscious experience across a range of entities (from self and other humans through animals, plants, fungi, and inanimate objects, to the universe) before and after a psychedelic experience that the respondent judged to have produced the greatest belief change. Josipovic and colleagues aimed to test whether such attribution increases occur, whether they are related to the intensity of mystical-type experiences, and whether changes persist over time.

This was an anonymous online survey of adults (≥18 years) who endorsed having experienced a psychedelic episode that led to belief change and who could complete the survey in English. Participants were asked to respond about a single reference experience "that you feel led to the greatest belief change," specifying which classic psychedelic was used (psilocybin, LSD, ayahuasca, N,N‑DMT, 5‑MeO‑DMT, mescaline-containing cacti, or other), estimated dose, concomitant drugs, age at the experience, and time elapsed since the event. Recruitment occurred via internet postings, social media, relevant websites (e.g., Erowid), and email invitations between August 2020 and January 2021. The survey was hosted on Qualtrics, designed to take about 50 minutes, and included demographics, lifetime psychedelic use, personality, scientific attitudes, and detailed questions about the reference psychedelic experience. Participation was voluntary with no compensation and the study received IRB approval from Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine. Key measures included the 30‑item Mystical Experience Questionnaire (MEQ30) scored as a percentage of maximum possible score, with a priori criteria for a "complete" mystical experience defined as ≥60% on each of the four subscales. Psychological challenge was rated on an 8‑point scale and two 8‑point items assessed enduring personal meaning and psychological insight attributed to the experience. Belief ratings used 7‑point Likert-style items from −3 (Strongly disagree) to +3 (Strongly agree) for three timepoints: "Before (e.g., a month)," "After (e.g., a month)," and "Now." The primary belief domain of interest was attribution of conscious awareness across nine items (self, other humans, non-human primates, quadrupeds, insects, fungi, plants, inanimate objects, and a separate item "The universe is conscious"). Superstitious beliefs were assessed with five items adapted from the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale, and belief in freewill was measured with a single item. Statistical analyses were conducted in R v4.0.2. Paired t‑tests and Cohen’s d were used for continuous belief ratings between successive timepoints, and McNemar’s tests for proportions endorsing any agreement. Given large sample size, the authors pre‑specified an outcome would be considered meaningfully different only if p < 1 × 10−5 and effect size Cohen’s d ≥ 0.2 (or for proportions, p < 1 × 10−5 and an absolute difference ≥10%). To examine the role of mystical experience, participants were split at the median MEQ score (low vs high) and linear mixed models treated MEQ as a continuous predictor while controlling for age, age at experience, sex, race, whether the episode was the first psychedelic experience, whether it occurred in the past year, number of lifetime psychedelic uses, which psychedelic was taken, and psychological challenge. The authors also report internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) for the consciousness attribution items.

Survey flow and sample: Of 11,281 visitors to the survey landing page, 4,997 consented; sequential exclusions for language, lack of a qualifying belief‑changing experience, failed attention checks, non‑eligible drugs or multiple psychoactive drugs, inconsistent responses, and incomplete surveys yielded a final analytic sample of 1,606 respondents. The final sample had mean (SD) age 35.1 (13.3) years, was 67% male and 89% white, and 69% resided in the United States. Participants reported a mean (SD) of 20.9 (25.7) lifetime psychedelic uses. The reference belief‑changing experience occurred a mean (SD) of 8.2 (12.6) years before the survey; 25% reported the experience in the past 12 months and 44% indicated it was their first such belief‑changing psychedelic experience. The most commonly reported substances at the reference event were psilocybin mushrooms (49%) and LSD (33%). Qualities of the reference experience: Participants recalled high levels of mystical phenomenology on the MEQ30 (mean 74% of maximum, SD = 20), and 49% met the pre‑specified criteria for a complete mystical experience. Around 70% rated the experience among the five most personally meaningful and insightful of their lives. Primary outcome — attribution of consciousness: Agreement ratings for the nine consciousness‑attribution items declined across entities in the expected order (self highest, inanimate objects lowest). From "Before" to "After" the reference psychedelic experience, all nine items showed statistically significant and meaningfully large increases according to the authors' criteria (p < 1 × 10−5 and Cohen’s d ≥ 0.2). Expressed as proportions endorsing any agreement (slightly agree to strongly agree), the increases were substantial; for example, agreement that plants were capable of conscious experience rose from 26% Before to 61% After. The paper reports analogous large increases for non‑human primates (reported ranges in the text include increases such as 63% to 83%), quadrupeds (59% to 79%), insects (33% to 57%), fungi (21% to 56%), inanimate natural objects (8% to 26%), and inanimate manmade objects (3% to 15%). Cronbach’s alpha for the nine items was 0.87 at all timepoints, indicating good internal consistency. Importantly, none of the Before→After increases attenuated between the "After" and "Now" timepoints at the group level; the authors report that differences from After to Now did not meet the pre‑specified criteria for meaningful change, and the elevated attributions remained unchanged on average a mean of 8 years after the experience. Relationship with mystical experience: Higher MEQ scores were associated with greater increases in attribution of consciousness. When participants were stratified by median MEQ score, both low and high MEQ groups showed meaningful Before→After increases, but the high MEQ group exhibited larger effects. Linear mixed models treating MEQ as continuous confirmed this association after controlling for age, sex, race, first psychedelic, past‑year occurrence, lifetime uses, drug type, and psychological challenge. Secondary outcomes — superstitions and freewill: In contrast to shifts in mind‑attribution, the five superstitious belief items and the single freewill item showed no meaningful changes between Before and After or between After and Now under the authors' predefined criteria. MEQ scores did not significantly affect these outcomes. Overall, the pattern suggests domain‑specific increases in attribution of consciousness rather than a global acquiescence or demand‑driven response shift.

Josipovic and colleagues interpret their findings as evidence that, among people who report a psychedelic experience that they believe changed their convictions, a single psychedelic episode is associated with large, rapid, and enduring increases in attributing conscious awareness to a broad range of living and non‑living entities. The authors highlight the magnitude and durability of the effects — many participants still reported elevated attributions a mean of 8 years after the reference experience — and emphasise the relationship between the intensity of mystical‑type phenomenology (MEQ scores) and the size of belief change. They link these empirical observations to phenomenological features of mystical experiences (for example, a sense of external unity and a noetic or authoritative quality) that plausibly promote a conviction that "all things are alive." The discussion considers possible mechanisms. One suggested contributor is reports of "entity encounters" during psychedelic states (sensing intelligences or spirits in plants/substances), which prior surveys have documented. An evolutionary perspective is invoked to note that attribution of agency has adaptive value, and developmental work is cited to suggest that wide attribution of consciousness may be typical in children and later suppressed. The authors also speculate cautiously about psychedelic‑induced neuroplasticity reopening a developmental ‘‘critical period’’ as a possible facilitating mechanism, referencing analogous evidence from single‑dose MDMA studies. Limitations are acknowledged: the retrospective design, self‑selection of participants who endorsed belief change, and the potential for demand characteristics or reporting bias. The authors argue that the lack of changes in beliefs about freewill and superstitions reduces, but does not eliminate, concerns that responses were simply biased by demand characteristics. They also note that their sample is not representative of the general population, given recruitment methods and demographic composition. Finally, the authors call for prospective, controlled psychedelic administration studies that include expectancy controls to better determine causality and the determinants of the robust increases in attribution of consciousness observed in this retrospective sample.